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Abstract 
In this paper, author tried to find relation of foreign direct investment inflows with its determinants like growth 
rate, interest rate, exchange rate, inflation rate, fiscal deficit, openness in India during 1971-2015 through 
causality, co-integration and vector error correction models. In this paper, it was attempted to explain clearly 
that how foreign direct investment inflows and outflows have changed during several financial crises in 
different regions of the world since 1970s in support with a historical analysis over global financial crises. The 
paper concludes that FDI inflows in India has been catapulting at the rate of 21.56% per year during 1971-
2015 and exponentially at the rate of 0.6044% per year significantly. It has four upward structural breaks in 
1985, 1994, 2000 and 2006 respectively during the specified period. FDI inflows in India has causal relation 
uni-directionally with fiscal deficit, and bi-directionally with inflation, exchange rate, interest rate and growth 
rate during 1971-2015.Johansen co-integration test confirmed that Trace Statistic contains four co-integrating 
equations and Max Eigen Statistic has three co-integrating equations. VECM is stable, non-stationary and not 
good fit for four estimated equations and error corrections for the equations of change of interest rate and 
inflation rate showed significant with speeds of 23% and 103% per year. The paper also concludes that FDI 
does not cause Granger financial crises, but financial crises do cause Granger FDI. 
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Introduction 
Foreign Direct Investment has several dimensions. It affects host countries’ balance of payments and 
development process. It has long run effects on economic growth and sustainable development which depend 
on the character of FDI. However, the nexus between growth and FDI is indeterminate since it varies from 
region to region, country to country and from period to period although the globalization, liberalization and 
privatization drives accelerated the speed of the nexus towards positive direction irrespective of the distribution 
of income. Historically, FDI changes from merchants’ capital to multinational investments, from imperialistic 
attitude to trade domination through economic integration (via financial integration) in international trade and 
finance. 
FDI does not cause crises directly, but it has indirect causes of bubbles and busts. Debt finance through FDI 
may stimulate debt burden under recession. Financial and banking crises may emerge if FDI in banking sector 
find losses and shut downs. Yet we cannot avoid the fact that FDI does not Granger cause of financial crises 
but financial crises do Granger cause FDI changes which were observed in all the financial crises in the world. 
Since the Baring crisis in 1870, India’s FDI was dominated by British imperialism through East India Company 
whose chief competitors were Dutch East India Company, Danish East India Company, Portuguese East India 
Company, French East India Company and Swedish East India Company respectively. In 1913, India’s foreign 
investment stood 35% of GDP  and per capita foreign investment was 6 dollar at 1900 US dollar and foreign 
direct investment as percent of domestic capital stock was 9%.Presently,India’s FDI inflows is very low in 
comparison to other countries ,e.g. in 2017 , India’s FDI was accounted as 1.9% of GDP and government of 
India expects it to rise to 2.5% of GDP with in next five years. In 2017, Mauritius was the top donor country 
to India comprising 11.47 billion US Dollar followed by Singapore 5.29 billion US Dollar, Netherlands 1.95 
billion US Dollar, USA 1.33 billion US Dollar and Germany 934 million US Dollar respectively. As on 2017, 
Service sector is leading the sectoral distribution of FDI i.e. 8.68 billion US Dollar followed by 
telecommunication 5.56 billion US Dollar, Computer hardware and software 3.65 billion US Dollar, Trading 
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2.34 billion US Dollar, Automobile 1.61 billion US Dollar, and Metallurgical industry 1.44 billion US Dollar 
respectively. During the era of globalization and liberalization, India is following 100 % liberalization in FDI 
inflows in several sectors of the economy. India is not the exceptional country from where global financial 
crises did not enter and affect negatively like other developed and developing countries. Foreign direct 
investment flows also affected due to financial crises in Indian economy which is a great content of research 
in relating to other macro fundamentals.    
On this overview, author tried to verify nexus between FDI inflows and growth in Indian economy using 
econometric analysis and studied analytically the changes of FDI flows during crises. 
1. Literature review 
The nexus between Growth and FDI inflows varies from country to country, from one period to another and 
from one sector to other in which there are many economic literatures that represent economic relevance. 
Chakraborty & Basu (2002) suggest that GDP in India is not Granger caused by FDI, the causality seems to 
run more from GDP to FDI. Li &Liu (2005) studied 84 countries using data of 1970-1999 periods and 
concluded that a 10% increase in FDI can stipulate 4.1% growth rate per year. Johnson (2006) took 90 
developed and developing countries using data of 1980-2002 period and concluded positive relation through 
OLS method. Hansen & Rand (2006) used co-integration and causality tests in 31 developing countries during 
1970-2000 and showed positive relation. Herzer et.al (2008) verified the nexus in 28 developing countries 
during 1970-2003 and found positive nexus. Applying vector error correction model, Dinda (2009) empirically 
investigated the determinants of foreign direct investment inflows to Nigeria during 1970-2006. This study 
suggests that the endowment of natural resources, openness, macroeconomic risk factors like inflation and 
exchange rates are significant determinants of FDI inflows to Nigeria. Stehrer & Woerz (2009) verified the 
relation in OECD and non OECD countries during 1981-2000 and found that a 10% increase in FDI can 
increase 1.2% in growth rate per year. Ewing & Yang (2009) studied 48 states in USA during 1977-2001 in 
manufacturing sector and found direct relation between growth and FDI. Nair (2010) showed that FDI has a 
positive and highly significant effect on overall growth in India during 1970-2000 in regression results which 
leads to an increase in market size. The result proves that it cannot be rejected that the FDI does not Granger 
cause GDP growth at the 5% level, but it can be reflected that GDP growth does not Granger cause FDI. 
N’guessan & Yue (2010) concluded that there is a long run relationship between FDI, trade openness and 
growth which stated that about 10% increase in trade openness would lead to about 97% growth of output and 
10% increase in FDI would result in about 1% in growth of output. The UNCTAD study which covers 140 
countries over the period 1998-2000 with 8 explanatory variables show that FDI can be explained in terms of 
GDP per capita, exports as a percentage of GDP and telephone lines per 1000 of the populations. In general 
terms the results tell us that countries that are more successful in attracting FDI are developed countries with 
a high degree of openness. Factors failing the EBA robustness test as determinants of FDI inflows included: 
GDP growth rate, commercial energy use, R&D expenditure, tertiary enrolments and country risk. Tiwari & 
Mihari (2011) verified that exports and FDI show a significant and positive impact on economic growth in a 
panel of 23 Asian countries during 1986-2008. Adeniyi, Omisakin, Egwaikhide & Oyinlola (2012) showed 
that FDI has positive linkage over economic growth in five ECOWAS countries during 1970-2005 which was 
verified through Granger causality tests in VEC model. Yesuf & Tsehaye (2012) investigated the causal link 
between FDI and economic growth in Ethiopia during 1974-2010 and did not find any causality running from 
FDI to growth or vice versa but there was an evidence of co-integration between FDI and growth. The flow of 
FDI is too small to translate into growth. Using the VAR Granger causality/ Block Exogeneity Wald Test in 
Cote d’Ivoire during 1980-2007, Anyanwu (2012) estimated from cross-country regressions for the period 
1996-2008 which indicate that: (i) there is a positive relationship between market size and FDI inflows; (ii) 
openness to trade has a positive impact on FDI inflows; (iii) higher financial development has negative effect 
on FDI inflows; (iv) the prevalence of the rule of law increases FDI inflows; (v) higher FDI goes where foreign 
aid also goes; (vi) agglomeration has a strong positive impact on FDI inflows; (vi) natural resource endowment 
and exploitation (such as oil) attracts huge FDI; (vii) East and Southern African sub-regions appear positively 
disposed to obtain higher levels of inward FDI. Tintin (2012) showed that FDI spurs economic growth and 
development in developed, developing and the least developed countries which was found from the study of a 
sample of 125 countries (38 developed, 58 developing and 29 least developed countries) over the 1980-2010 
period by using least square method of the panel data. Ragimana (2012) studied that FDI growth nexus was 
positive in Solomon Island during 1970-2010 which was verified through Granger Causality test and Co-
integration test. Adelake (2014) found that FDI had positive overall effect on economic growth in Sub-Saharan 
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Africa, although the magnitude of this effect depends on some country specific features during 1996-2010 of 
31 SSA countries of panel data where role of governance should positive on encouraging FDI inflows.  
2. Objective of the paper 
In this paper, author tried to find relation of foreign direct investment inflows with macro determinants like 
growth rate, interest rate, exchange rate, inflation rate, fiscal deficit, openness in India during 1971-2015 
through causality, co-integration and vector error correction models along with other residual tests. Even, 
author found out the trends and structural shifts of foreign direct investment inflows in India during the same 
period. In this paper, it was attempted to explain clearly that how foreign direct investment inflows and 
outflows have changed during several financial crises in different regions of the world since 1970s in support 
with a historical analysis over global financial crises. In this context, the limitations of the paper, future scope 
of research and some policy prescriptions have been placed for forthcoming discussions.    
3. Methodology and data 
Assume,x1=GDP growth rate per cent per year,x2=interest rate per cent per year(discount rate),x3=exchange 
rate of rupee per US dollar,x4=inflation rate(per cent change of CPI),x5=fiscal deficit per cent of 
GDP,x6=external debt per cent of GDP,x7= trade openness per cent ,y= FDI inflows in India in million US 
dollar. Data have been collected from the World Bank, and International Financial Statistics of IMF from 1971 
to 2015.Semi-log and exponential regression models were applied to calculate trends. Granger (1969) model 
was applied to test causality. Bai-Perron model (2003) was applied to find structural breaks of the foreign 
direct investment inflows in India. For co-integration test and vector error correction analysis we used Johansen 
(1988, 1996) methodologies. We used Hansen-Doornik (1994) test for normality. 
4. Economic growth-foreign direct investment nexus: A Case Study of India. Observations from 
the Econometric models 
India’s FDI inflows have been increasing at the 21.56% per year during 1971-2015 which is significant at 5% 
level. 
Log(y)=1.4485+0.215672t 
               (4.11)* (16.16)* 
R2=0.858, F=261.37*, DW=1.53,*=significant at 5% level, y=FDI inflows in million dollars. t=year (time).  
In Figure 1, the actual and fitted trend lines have been plotted. The fitted line is steeply rising upward. 
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Figure 1. Trend line of FDI inflows 
Source-Plotted by author 
The exponential fitted trend line of Indian FDI inflows during 1971-2015 is also significant and it is 
exponentially rising at the rate 0.6044% per year.  
y ൌ ݁଴.଺଺ହଵା బ.లబరరళయశೠ೟ ,  
where Ut=-0.117016Ut-1 
                     (-0.7077) 
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R2=0.828, DW=2.13, Inverted AR root=0.50±0.30i and -0.34, the t values of 0.6651 and 0.604473 are 
5.064583 and 112.5020 respectively which are significant at 5% level. The estimated exponential trend line 
and actual line are shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Exponential trend of FDI inflows 
Source-Plotted by author 
Applying Bai-Perron test (2003) of L+1 vs. L sequential determined breaks selecting Trimming 0.15, 
maximum breaks 5 with 5% significant level, we found four upward structural breaks in 1985, 1994, 2000, 
2006 respectively following HAC standard errors and covariance and Newey-West fixed band width=4.0. In 
Table 1, the significant values are given. 
Table 1. Structural breaks 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
  1971 - 1984 -- 14 obs   
C 2.968555 0.483099 6.144817 0.0000 
  1985 - 1993 -- 9 obs   
C 5.184334 0.198430 26.12671 0.0000 
  1994 - 1999 - 6 obs   
C 7.690081 0.173512 44.32012 0.0000 
  2000 - 2005 - 6 obs   
C 8.566927 0.102723 83.39861 0.0000 
  2006 - 2015 - 10 obs   
C 10.26461 0.087104 117.8438 0.0000 
  R2=0.889, F=80.4*, DW=1.99   
Break test: Sequential F-statistic determined breaks:4 
Break Test   F-statistic Scaled F-statistic Critical Value**  
0 vs. 1 * 136.9461 136.9461 8.58  
1 vs. 2 * 133.9357 133.9357 10.13  
2 vs. 3 * 19.38291 19.38291 11.14  
3 vs. 4 * 18.00003 18.00003 11.83  
4 vs. 5 0.999666 0.999666 12.25  
Source: Computed by author, *=significant at 5% level. 
In Figure 3, the successive four upward breaks have been plotted in the fitted line showing actual line and 
residual lines of FDI inflows in terms of log. 
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Figure 3. Structural breaks in FDI inflows 
Source: Plotted by author. 
Granger causality test assured that there are no causality between FDI (y1) and openness(x7), but there exists 
uni-directional causality between FDI and fiscal deficit (x5), and there are bi-directional causality among FDI 
and inflation(x4),FDI and exchange rate(x3) and FDI and interest rate (x2), FDI inflows and growth rate (x1) 
respectively during 1971-2015 .In Table-2,the results of Granger causality test are given. This observation is 
similar to the studies of Sarbapriya Ray (2012). 
Table 2. Granger causality test 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
 Y does not Granger Cause X1  44  3.76020 0.0594 
 X1 does not Granger Cause Y    2.65379 0.1110 
 Y does not Granger Cause X2  44  0.06276 0.8034 
 X2 does not Granger Cause Y   3.24339 0.0791 
 Y does not Granger Cause X3  44  0.27972 0.5997 
 X3 does not Granger Cause Y   3.35859 0.0741 
 Y does not Granger Cause X4  44  0.10544 0.7470 
 X4 does not Granger Cause Y    1.27829 0.2648 
 Y does not Granger Cause X5  44  9.75678 0.0033 
 X5 does not Granger Cause Y   0.00764 0.9308 
 Y does not Granger Cause X6  44  0.53797 0.4674 
 X6 does not Granger Cause Y   0.07397 0.7870 
 Y does not Granger Cause X7  44  6.74823 0.0130 
 X7 does not Granger Cause Y   14.6940 0.0004 
Source: Computed by author. 
Johansen unrestricted co-integration rank test showed that Trace statistic has four co-integrating equations and 
Max Eigen Statistic has three co-integrating equations which are shown in Table 3. Therefore the variables are 
co-integrated in order of CI (1). According to Trace statistic, there must be three linear combinations and 
according to Max Eigen statistic there must be two linear combinations. This result is more or less similar to 
researches of Basu, Chakraborty & Reagle (2003), Saji (2013) and Chakraborty & Basu (2010).  
Table 3. Johansen Co-integration test 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigen value Trace Statistic 0.05 Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.732982 219.9294 159.5297 0.0000 
At most 1 * 0.659855 163.1505 125.6154 0.0000 
At most 2 * 0.612689 116.7800 95.75366 0.0008 
At most 3 * 0.495951 75.99326 69.81889 0.0148 
At most 4 0.348309 46.53476 47.85613 0.0662 
At most 5 0.309576 28.12279 29.79707 0.0770 
At most 6 0.240770 12.19346 15.49471 0.1479 
At most 7 0.008086 0.349106 3.841466 0.5546 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigen value Max Eigen Statistic 0.05 Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.732982 56.77893 52.36261 0.0166 
At most 1 * 0.659855 46.37050 46.23142 0.0483 
At most 2 * 0.612689 40.78672 40.07757 0.0415 
At most 3 0.495951 29.45849 33.87687 0.1540 
At most 4 0.348309 18.41197 27.58434 0.4612 
At most 5 0.309576 15.92934 21.13162 0.2290 
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Table 3 (cont.). Johansen Co-integration test 
At most 6 0.240770 11.84435 14.26460 0.1166 
At most 7 0.008086 0.349106 3.841466 0.5546 
 Notes: * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level, **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values, H0=No co-integration, 
Source-Computed by author. 
Since the variables are co-integrated, then the estimated vector error correction model is given below. The 
study of VECM was also tested by Dash & Parida (2013) and Ray (2012) in India. 
[1] Δx1t=-0.024378-0.46107Δx1t-1-0.0624Δx2t-1+0.2556Δx3t-1+0.1718Δx4t-1+0.3480Δx5t-1 
(-0.043)      (-2.75)*          (-0.089)            (1.048)             (1.94)               (0.78) 
-0.28909Δx6t-1-0.0729Δx7t-1+2.28E-05Δyt-1-0.2381EC 
(-0.714)              (-0.29)      (-1.02)                (-1.02) 
R2=0.48, F=3.4, AIC=5.14    , SC=5.55,*=significant at 5% level , Δx1t and Δx1t-1 are negatively related significantly. 
[2] Δx2t=-0.0924+0.1129Δx1t-1-0.2025Δx2t-1+0.0076Δx3t-1+0.0068Δx4t-1+0.0207Δx5t-1 
(-0.72)    (2.88)*          (-1.27)             (0.137)              (0.337)           (0.203) 
-0.0855Δx6t-1+0.0303Δx7t-1+ 3.02E-05Δyt-1-0.23196EC 
(-0.92)             (0.529)              (1.129)        (-4.33)* 
R2= 0.49,  F=3.6,   AIC=2.19,   SC=2.6,*=significant, Δx2t and Δx1t-1 are positively related significantly. 
[3] Δx3t==1.3603+-0.00155Δx1t-1+0.711074Δx2t-1+ 0.2534Δx3t-1-0.05331Δx4t-1-0.762132Δx5t-1 
(2.92) *    (-0.011)          (1.23)                 (1.25)            (-0.72)           (2.06)* 
-0.39126Δx6t-1-0.157501Δx7t-1-0.157501Δyt-1-0.179943EC 
(-1.16)             (-0.76)              (-0.51)        (-0.92) 
R2= 0.19,  F=0.87,   AIC=4.7,   SC=5.1,*=significant , Δx3 and Δx5t-1 are negatively related significantly. 
[4] Δx4t=0.388400-0.007038Δx1t-1-0.907988Δx2t-1+  0.079949Δx3t-1-0.246616Δx4t-1- 
(2.92)*    (-0.082)          (0.68)                   (0.17)             (-1.47) 
0.097889Δx5t-1-0.952970Δx6t-1-0.442524Δx7t-1+0.000244Δyt-1-1.025525EC 
(-0.115)              (-1.24)             (-0.93)               (1.10)             (-2.31)* 
R2= 0.26,  F=1.33,   AIC=6.42,   SC=6.83,*=significant 
[5] Δx5t=-0.106383+0.007038Δx1t-1+-0.071309Δx2t-1+ 0.109699Δx3t-1+0.013372Δx4t-1 
(-0.49)       (0.109)               (-0.26)                 (1.17)                (0.17) 
+ 0.158234Δx5t-1 -0.053390Δx6t-1-0.016278Δx7t-1+ 0.000125Δyt-1-0.004321EC 
(0.92)                    (-0.34)               (-0.17)                    (2.8)*        (-0.04) 
R2= 0.33,  F=1.86,   AIC=3.22,   SC=3.68,*=significant, Δx5t and Δyt-1 are positively related significantly. 
[6] Δx6t= 0.325363+0.204180Δx1t-1-0.386254Δx2t-1-0.073751Δx3t-1+0.010424Δx4t-1- 
(0.87)          (1.83)               (-0.83)             (-0.073)           (0.17) 
0.134339Δx5t-1+0.175616Δx6t-1-0.059622Δx7t-1+2.09E-05Δyt-1-0.277907EC 
(-0.45)                (0.65)             (-0.36)              (0.27)              (-1.79) 
R2= 0.2  F=1.04,   AIC=4.31,   SC=4.72 
[7] Δx7t=1.557461+0.064348Δx1t-1-0.445270Δx2t-1-0.675446Δx3t-1+0.033164Δx4t-1 
(4.24) *    (0.58)               (-0.97)             (-4.22)*             (0.57) 
-0.264192Δx5t-1 +0.345774Δx6t-1+0.345774Δx7t-1-0.000255Δyt-1+0.051273EC 
(-0.90)                     (0.49)             (2.11)*              (-3.33)*        (0.33) 
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R2= 0.59,  F=5.32*,   AIC=4.29,   SC=4.7,*=significant , Δx7t and Δx7t-1 are positively related significant and Δx7t and 
Δyt-1 are negatively related significantly. 
[8] Δyt=2834.112-89.85084Δx1t-1+842.2183Δx2t-1-1391.315Δx3t-1-174.3453Δx4t-1-1692.335Δx5t-1 
(2.86)*    (-0.3)                 (0.68)               (-3.22)*             (-1.11)           (-2.14)* 
+155.3180Δx6t-1+147.5783Δx7t-1-0.348757Δyt-1+ 202.9272EC 
(0.21)                    (0.33)              (-1.69)           (0.49) 
R2= 0.42 F=2.71, AIC=20.09, SC=20.50,*=significant, Δyt ,Δx5t-1and Δx3t-1 are negatively related significantly. 
This VECM is good fit for equations [1] Δx1t, [2] Δx2t and [7] Δx7t. The speed of the vector error correction 
process is more or less slow except for Δx2t and Δx4t which are significant. Δx2t   has been correcting the error 
by 23.16% per year and Δx4t has been correcting the error by 102.55% per year respectively. 
Yet this VECM is stable since it has 10 roots in which six roots are imaginary (0.518961 ± 0.209573i, -
0.308760 ± 0.428752i, -0.165298 ± 0.346439i), one root is one and other three roots (-0.543200, 0.328063, 
0.138599) are less than one, all of which lie in the unit circle. It is shown in the Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Unit circle 
Source-Computed by author 
The Impulse Response Functions of VECM have been diverging away from equilibrium which means that 
exogenous shocks do not turn the model into equilibrium. It is shown in Figure 5 (response of x1 , x2, x3, x4, 
x5, x6, x7 ,y to Cholesky one SD innovations).These lines are moving away from zero. It means that the VECM 
is non-stationary.  
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Figure 5. Impulse Response Functions. 
Source- Plotted by author. 
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Residual tests of this VECM assure that the residuals have the problem of autocorrelations which is shown in 
Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Autocorrelations problem 
Source-Plotted by author 
The Serial correlation LM test of the residuals of the Vector Error Correction Model suggested that the 
variables are serially correlated which is seen in the Table 4. 
Table 4. Serial correlation LM test 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1 69.08543 0.3097 
2 76.00517 0.1447 
3 60.44998 0.6028 
4 67.75267 0.3504 
5 51.45797 0.8709 
6 82.35328 0.0610 
7 63.05198 0.5100 
8 61.63928 0.5605 
9 56.77821 0.7272 
10 42.09907 0.9844 
11 65.69198 0.4180 
12 75.12452 0.1612 
Source-Calculated by author  
The VEC residual normality test as done by Hansen-Doornik (1994) methodology has shown that the joint 
components of Kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are significant but most of the other components of Skewness, 
Kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are not significant according to the values of Chi-square distribution, therefore, the 
residuals are not multivariate normal. In Table 5, their values are given. 
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Table 5. Hansen-Doornik normality test 
Component Skewness Chi-square df Probability. 
1 -0.084242 0.064756 1 0.7991 
2 -0.194496 0.341888 1 0.5587 
3 0.158327 0.227451 1 0.6334 
4 -0.642132 3.360874 1 0.0668 
5 -0.460680 1.822804 1 0.1770 
6 0.710372 4.022242 1 0.0449 
7 0.395926 1.367554 1 0.2422 
8 0.672477 3.650127 1 0.0561 
Joint  14.85770 8 0.0620 
Component Kurtosis Chi-square df Prob. 
1 2.806869 0.180811 1 0.6707 
2 3.673029 3.119953 1 0.0773 
3 2.743956 0.054829 1 0.8149 
4 8.172222 31.27463 1 0.0000 
5 3.160990 0.104753 1 0.7462 
6 5.533883 7.996608 1 0.0047 
7 2.384901 1.219767 1 0.2694 
8 3.384075 0.017875 1 0.8936 
Joint  43.96922 8 0.0000 
Component Jarque-Bera df Probability.  
1 0.245568 2 0.8845  
2 3.461841 2 0.1771  
3 0.282280 2 0.8684  
4 34.63550 2 0.0000  
5 1.927557 2 0.3814  
6 12.01885 2 0.0025  
7 2.587321 2 0.2743  
8 3.668003 2 0.1598  
Joint 58.82692 16 0.0000  
Source-Calculated by author. 
5. Analytical framework of financial crises and FDI  
Capital inflows played a great role in financial crises in which foreign direct investment is of primary 
importance because current account imbalance during financial crises is somehow corrected through capital 
inflows or huge foreign direct investment for getting boosting output and growth.  A 1% increase in FDI/GDP 
ratio is followed by a 0.80% increase in future domestic investment/GDP in Africa. The anticipated decline 
crisis would therefore adversely affect the country’s performance. (Mwega, 2009) 
In 1914, total foreign investment of USA (FI = FDI + FPI) was 19.5% of GNP while FDI was 4.7%. By 1918, 
the total (FI) was down to 3.9% while FDI was 1.3%. The 1920s did not change these percentages very much 
but the 1930s raised them so that by 1939 they stood at 6.8-9.6% and 3.2%, respectively. By the end of World 
War II, total FI was 3.7% and FDI was 1.3%. Wilkins’s rich account of foreign investment in the U.S. is also 
a major part of the story of the retreat from the pre-World War I high-tide of globalization. (Wilkins,2005) 
In the post war period, British and France lost foreign investment amounting in all to somewhere between 4 
and 5 billion dollars i.e. approximately 25% of British and 50% of French prewar foreign investment although 
in 1914,34 countries (10 developed and 24 less developed countries) produced 97% of world GDP and received 
92% of British capital which spread into wider area and moved to Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Egypt, South Africa, 
India, Russia and Far East. During and after the War Germany lost practically all her foreign investment 
amounting to sum 5-8 billion dollars. After the first world war, British foreign investment in third world was 
stagnant, the Netherlands, Belgium and Japan all expanded their investment into their colonies rather 
continually up to world war II, while not having appreciable FDI in the rest of the third world. (Twomey,2002) 
In 1915, the British FDI was 43 million pound which increased to 110 million pound in 1916 and then started 
to decline and stood 60 million pound in 1917 and 23 million pound in 1918 respectively. On the other hand, 
during 1924-30, 10-11 billion dollar capital flowed in the world in which 60% came from USA, 15% from UK 
and France and balance from Switzerland, Netherland, Czechoslovakia and Sweden respectively. In the 1930s 
the crisis was global because the great depression was global. Assuming 1929 as 100, the world trade index 
fell to 39, export value and import price declined to 74 and 52 respectively and world industry production, 
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Europe and North American industry production fell down to 64,42, and 54 respectively in 1932 as 1929 as 
the base. Even the value of export sharply fell to 45 for Germany, 39 for France, 36 for UK and 40 for Europe. 
FDI had a strong negative effects in the Baring Crises of 1890, the American Panic of 1907, the Financial 
Crises of July-August 1914, the banking crises of the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Financial Instability 
of the early 1970s, the International Debt Crisis of 1982, the Japanese Banking Crisis of 1997-8, and the US 
Financial Debacle of 2007-8, and Euro crisis of 2009-10, respectively. 
In Figure 7, the judgement index of extent of capital mobility is measured in the left vertical axis and is marked 
by red line. The share of countries in Banking crisis (3 year sum) is measured in the right hand vertical axis 
and is marked by blue line. The capital mobility is classified into low, medium and high during 1880-2007.The 
low and moderate capital mobility was seen during 1800-1879.Only low capital mobility was observed during 
1915-1919 and 1930-1969, only moderate capital mobility was seen during 1920-1929 and 1970-1979, and 
only high capital mobility was seen during 1880-1914 and 1980-2007 respectively. During 1800-1979, 17 low, 
medium and high income countries fell into banking crises, during 1880-1914, total 19 countries fell into 
banking crisis, during 1915-1919, only one country showed the crisis, during 1920-1929, total 13 countries, 
during 1930-1969, total 10 countries, during 1970-1979, total 7 countries and during 1980-2007, total 51 
countries fell into banking crisis respectively. Therefore, it is fact that as capital mobility moves from low to 
high level, the share of countries with banking crises tends from low to high. This means capital flows may 
lead to financial crises. 
 
Figure 7. Capital mobility and banking crisis during 1800-2007 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
More or less similar pattern of foreign investment had been observed in different international monetary system 
during 1860-2000 where the gold standard had enjoyed the maximum benefit from the foreign investment as 
was evident in 1900s but there was a sharp fall of the foreign investment in all the financial crises as observed 
in the monetary systems (Figure 8). In the gold standard during 1860-1914, Britain’s supremacy of FDI flows 
in the world was noticed and the Gold Standard broke down in 1931.The War and the depression in the interwar 
period there was the great fall of world FDI flows although US FDI outflows began to increase. After the 
Bretton Woods, the FDI flows started to increase speedily where US dominance could not be ignored but 
Japan’s hegemony in 80s and 90s is the important phenomenon when floating exchange rate in the international 
monetary system was activised after the break down of Bretton Woods and US dominance in foreign capital 
started to decline due to emergence of capital flows from Euro Area under European Monetary System (Also 
see Bhowmik, 2016). 
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Figure 8. Trend of Foreign investment in different monetary system during 1860-2000 
Source: Obstfeld and Taylor (2002). 
FDI inflows declined only in the Developing and SAARC countries and outflows of FDI declined only in 
NAFTA and no other countries or blocs had no major adverse impact as a result of Financial crisis in 1970.The 
oil shock of 1979 along with Mexican crisis had a great impact of declining donor countries FDI flows but the 
developed countries shortfall of inflows were seen only in 1980 but no adverse impact of FDI inflows was 
observed (Table 6). 
Table 6. FDI flows during the crises of 1970 and 1979 
 FDI inflows (million Dollar) 
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Developing C 3854 3631 3423 5175 8505 7469 24003 26353 
SAARC 68 49 35 36 148 203 255 203 
ASEAN 459 559 596 1245 1698 2636 3596 3624 
USA 1260 870 1350 2120 8700 16918 25195 13810 
UK 1488 1771 1207 2722 6469 10122 5879 5413 
NAFTA 3395 3449 3641 5761 14539 24824 28932 15834 
Japan 94 210 169 -42 239 278 189 439 
EuroArea 3457 3881 5020 6487 10443 10791 9915 8291 
 FDI Outflows (million Dollar) 
Dev.C 14100 14395 15656 25808 62453 48397 49931 24803 
NAFTA 8521 8075 7027 12518 30320 23331 18806 3575 
Euro Area 3144 3591 4543 5687 15438 13180 14705 10347 
USA 7590 7618 7747 11353 26493 19230 13227 1078 
UK 1678 1988 2017 4981 12539 7881 9386 3707 
Japan 355 360 723 1904 5965 6440 14402 20101 
Source: www.unctad.org. 
FDI inflows in South America including Brazil declined steadily and could not reach its peak level of 
1970.There were marginal adverse effects in the developing countries and Argentina in 1983 only. No donor 
countries’ FDI outflows fell abruptly except in LAIA, Japan and Brazil in 1983 because of International debt 
crisis in 1982 and oil shock (Table 7).  
Table 7. International debt crisis and oil shock in 1982 
 FDI Inflows (million dollars) 
 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Argentina 227 185 268 919 574 
Brazil 3115 1326 1501 1418 317 
Mexico 1900 2191 1540 1983 2400 
Caribbean 132 89 895 294 259 
Developing C 2074 1322 1884 2442 1770 
S. American C 4498 2659 1561 3699 1765 
 FDI Outflows (million dollars) 
USA 1078 9525 13045 13388 19641 
UK 3707 5302 7733 11068 17294 
Japan 4540 3612 5965 6440 14402 
Brazil 376 188 42 81 144 
Argentina -30 2 44 11 48 
Euro Area 10347 10759 12252 13255 24964 
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Table 7 (cont.). International debt crisis and oil shock in 1982 
FTAA 4566 12555 16867 17881 24377 
LAIA  1164 425 112 580 1088 
Source-www.unctad.org. 
Asian financial crisis and Japanese banking crisis broke out in mid 1990s where depreciation of currencies, 
decline of growth rate and employment, shuttered financial integration and disrupted capital flows. But the 
impact of this crisis in EU, USA, Africa was nil in case of FDI inflows but there is little impact of FDI inflows 
in China, India, Asia and South East Asia where inflows declined from 1998 in China and India, and declined 
only in 1998 in South Asia, East Asia and South East Asia. On the contrary, Japanese FDI outflows fell down 
sharply since 1997 and Chinese FDI outflows fell down only in 1999 but India’s outflows declined from 1997. 
Other regional outflows were undisturbed. (Table 8).   
Table 8. Capital Flows in Asian financial crises 
 FDI Inflows (million Dollar) 
 EU USA China India Japan Africa SA, EA, SEA W. Asia LAC 
1995 113480 58772 35849 2144 39 4694 73639 -2 12765 
1996 109642 84455 40180 2591 200 5622 89406 2892 20585 
1997 127626 103398 44237 3613 3200 7153 98507 5488 25889 
1998 261141 174434 43751 2614 3268 7713 86004 6580 29898 
1999 467154 294976 40319 2154 12741 8971 96224 936 34422 
2000 617321 281115 40772 2315 8149 8198 137348 3427 31090 
 FDI Outflows (million Dollar) 
1995 159036 92074 2000 119 22508 509 41824 -991 7306 
1996 183180 84424 2114 244 23442 28 49683 2273 5549 
1997 220416 95769 2563 113 26059 1708 49482 -281 14391 
1998 454266 131004 2634 48 24152 897 29985 -1698 8048 
1999 720052 142551 1775 79 22743 632 34447 656 21753 
2000 772949 139259 2324 336 32886 744 83641 1284 13442 
Source-World Investment Report-2001. 
The first indications of a global financial crisis emerged in the middle of 2007 with rising defaults on subprime 
mortgages in the U.S. Not only private financial institutions (such as Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley), 
but even nations (such as Iceland) found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy. As financial institutions have 
been increasingly forced to raise capital and tackle the liquidity problem, decreasing international bank 
lending, falling stock exchanges, declining portfolio investment, and initial public offerings (IPOs) put the 
international financial market on hold. 
Subsequently, Euro debt crisis began and spill over globally which had tremendous adverse impact on current 
account balance, output and financial market too in EU and abroad. International liquidity on Euro fell down 
and FDI flows declined abruptly (Bhowmik,2014). 
Global FDI hit a record peak in 2007 (2 trillion US$ or 16% of world gross fixed capital formation) but dropped 
sharply in 2008 for both inward and outward FDI flows (34% for outflows and 52% for inflows). While 
incoming FDI flows recovered slightly in 2009 and EU FDI outflows continued to decline by 24% and total 
world flows in 2010 reduced to 1 trillion US$. In Table 9, FDI inflows of USA, EU, Africa, West Asia, India, 
Japan and developing countries declined from 2008 or 2009 but FDI inflows in China, South East Asia, East 
Asia and Latin America and Caribbean dwindled only in 2009 and then revived. On the other hand, FDI 
outflows of EU, USA and Japan who are dominant donor of FDI fell down sharply from 2008 but there was 
little impact of FDI outflows of developing countries, South East Asia, East Asia and China although India’s 
FDI outflows declined from the beginning of the financial crisis. It was also well known that the growth rates 
of developed countries and the EU declined during the crisis. The revival of EU has started in last year after 
collapse of Euro crisis. Conversely the extent of decrease in GDP growth rates was smaller in some Asian 
countries than Europe and America. In Figure 9, the global FDI flows and growth moved towards the similar 
direction downward since the crisis but there was no recovery of FDI although the growth started to recover. 
Table 9. Capital flows in recent financial crises 
                            FDI Inflows (million Dollar) 
 EU USA China India Japan Dev.C. Africa SEA W. Asia LAC EA 
2007 906531 215952 83521 25350 22550 589430 51274 85640 79609 171929 165104 
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Table 9 (cont.). Capital flows in recent financial crises 
2008 571797 306366 108312 47139 24426 668439 58894 50543 93546 210679 195454 
2009 404791 143604 95000 35657 11939 530289 52964 47810 71919 150150 162523 
2010 429230 197905 114734 21125 1251 637063 43582 97898 59459 189855 214604 
2011 472852 226937 123985 36190 1755 735212 47598 109044 49058 249432 233818 
2012 275580 167620 121080 25542 1731 702826 11502 111336 47119 243861 214804 
                                              FDI Outflows (million Dollar) 
2007 1257890 393518 26510 17234 73548 330033 11081 59640 34063 80257 127132 
2008 982036 308296 55910 21147 128019 344034 10080 32255 37680 97773 143509 
2009 381955 266955 56530 16031 74699 273401 6281 39345 17890 55512 137783 
2010 497801 304399 68811 15933 56263 413220 9311 47414 13398 119236 206777 
2011 536499 396656 74654 12456 107601 422067 5376 58957 26184 105154 212519 
2012 329131 328869 84220 8583 122551 426082 14296 60592 23941 103045 214409 
Source: World Investment Report-2013. 
 
Figure 9. Global FDI and Growth since crisis 
Financial crises were often proceded by asset and credit booms that eventually turn into busts. Some historical 
asset price bubbles and crashes are well known: Dutch Tulip Mania from 1634-1637, the French Mississippi 
Bubble in 1719-20 and the South Sea Bubble in UK in 1720. European financial crisis of 1763, which involved 
highly levered and interlocked financial ties between Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Prussia and resulted 
insignificant asset resale that affected by market participants. The major banking crises occurred in the U.S. in 
1837 and in 1857. After the creation of a national U.S. banking system, banking panics occurred again (in 
varied forms) in 1873, 1884, 1893, 1907, and 1914. The Great Depression ultimately caused a full-blown 
international banking crisis. The South American debt crises led to the Brady Plan in 1989. A painful bust 
occurred in Scandinavia in the early 1990s by banking crises in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The burst of 
the bubble led to large drops in output in all three countries. Japan also suffered a major financial crisis in the 
early 1990s. In 1997 and 1998, the focus fell on East Asian countries and Russia. After large equity and real 
estate booms in East Asia, a run on Thailand's currency (the baht) led to a reversal of international capital 
flows to the entire region, triggering a financial crisis that quickly spread to other East Asian countries, such 
as Indonesia and Korea. In 2001, Argentina was unable to sustain the level of public sector debt it had 
accumulated over the 1990s. In January 2002, Argentina suspended the peso's peg to the dollar. Within a few 
days, the peso lost much of its value. The crisis led to a severe decrease in GDP and a spike in inflation. 
Ultimately, Argentina defaulted on its debts. In 2007-08, the US financial crisis began and spread over the 
world. The great financial crisis of 2008 in EU led to debt crises in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. 
These crises known as Euro crisis also highlight the intimate connection between banking crises and sovereign 
debt crises (Bhowmik, 2014). 
Laeven & Valencia (2013) reported that there are 147 banking crises, 217 currency crises, and 67sovereign 
debt crises over the period 1970 to 2011. Currency crises frequently tend to overlap with banking crises – so 
called twin crises (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999). In addition, sudden stop crises, not surprisingly, can overlap 
with currency and balance-of-payments crises, and sometimes sovereign crises. Of the 431, banking (147), 
currency (217) and sovereign (67) crises Laeven & Valencia (2013) reported that they consider 68 as twin 
crises, and 8 can be classified as triple crises. (Figure 10). A systemic banking crisis, for example, often 
involves a currency crisis and a sovereign crisis sometimes overlaps with other crises, 20 out of 67 sovereign 
crises are also a banking and 42 also a currency crisis. Laeven & Valencia (2013), estimate that fiscal costs, 
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net of recoveries, associated with crisis are on average about 6.8 percent of GDP. They can, however, be as 
high as 57 percent of GDP and in several cases are over 40 percent of GDP (for example Chile and Argentina 
in the early 1980s, Indonesia in the later 1990s, and Iceland and Ireland in 2008). Debt crises are more costly 
than banking and currency crises and are typically associated with output declines of 3-5 per cent after one 
year and 6-12 per cent after 8 years. Using a larger sample, Laeven & Valencia (2013) reported the median 
increase in public debt to be about 12 per cent for their sample of 147 systemic banking crises. Sudden stops 
are especially costly. Using a panel data set over 1975–1997 and covering 24 emerging markets, Glick 
&Hutchison (2011) finds that while a currency crisis typically reduces output by 2–3%, a sudden stop reduces 
output by an additional 6–8 per cent in the year of the crisis. The cumulative output loss of a sudden stop is 
even larger, about 13–15 percent over a 3-year period.  
 
Figure 10. Coincidence of Financial Crises 
Source-Laeven & Valencia (2013). 
6. Limitations of the study 
There are many determinants of FDI in the economy as suggested by existing literature available as on now, 
in which author has not included the following factors namely,(i) Market Size(ii) Portfolio Diversification(iii) 
Resource Location(iv) Differential Rate of Return(v) Foreign Exchange Reserves(vi) Internationalization (vii) 
Government Regulations(viii) Political Stability(ix) Tax Policies(x) Industrial Organization (xi) technology 
,(xii) human capital respectively. The choice variables depend on the needs of the economy. Some of the 
determinants are lag variables. Therefore, a single model cannot forecast all the relationships nor co-integration 
analysis is sufficient to explain qualitative and quantitative importance of the variables. Even, the models that 
are framed clearly are country specific and time dependent. Besides, the host countries’ behavior of FDI 
inflows in the developing countries are rather different than the developed countries. 
7. Scope of Future research 
There is huge scope of further research in the area. One can find root causes of banking crisis, currency crisis 
and sovereign debt crisis and can relate with growth either in a specific country or in regions during long period 
of time. How monetary and fiscal policies affect on those crises can be analyzed. One can highlight the Concept 
of Political economy of those crises. Above all, the periodical differences are very much importance in these 
fields. The paper demands historic and academic interests as well. More analysis can be done in the cases 
where FDI decline in every financial crisis regionally or sub-regionally. Even, why China and other East Asian 
countries did not react negatively too much in recent crises is to be an added future studies. 
In this model, FDI inflows in India had no causal relation with the openness during the study period whose 
inherent causes are to be searched in the offing. How far historical domination of FDI in India has changed is 
the important area of research in context of the paper.  
8. Some recommended policies 
Some general economic policies are urgent like [i] to reduce current account deficit, [ii] to reduce external 
debt, [iii] to cut down fiscal deficit, [iv] to fix target rate of inflation, [v] to follow monetary policy to reduce 
interest rate when needed, [vi] to increase trade openness respectively to get fruitful outcome of FDI inflows, 
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[vii] to increase weight on infrastructure improvements, training productive workers, and encouraging 
domestic firms to invest in technology in order to achieve sustained benefits from FDI, [viii] to relate 
productivity with FDI inflows, and employment with FDI inflows, [ix] to stimulate knowledge transfer in 
labour training and skill development, [x] to introduce alternative management practices, [xi] to form an honest 
and uncorrupted government, [xii] to study feasibility of FDI in various sectors and subsectors of the 
economy,[xiii] to compute potentiality of employment generation on the impact of FDI inflows in India.  
9. Concluding remarks 
The paper concludes that FDI inflows in India have been catapulting at the rate of 21.56% per year during 
1971-2015 and exponentially at the rate of 0.6044% per year significantly. It has four upward structural breaks 
in 1985,1994, 2000 and 2006 respectively during the specified period. FDI inflows in India has causal relation 
uni-directionally with fiscal deficit, and bi-directionally with inflation, exchange rate, interest rate and growth 
rate during 1971-2015.Johansen co-integration test confirmed that Trace Statistic contains four co-integrating 
equations and Max Eigen Statistic has three co-integrating equations. VECM is stable, non-stationary and not 
good fit for four estimated equations and error corrections for the equations of change of interest rate and 
inflation rate showed significant with speeds of 23% and 103% per year.     
The paper also concludes that FDI does not cause Granger financial crises but financial crises do cause Granger 
FDI. In every financial crisis since 1890, FDI changes downward but in Euro crises and US subprime crises, 
FDI did not decline in most of the East Asian countries. The declining growth and FDI in all financial crises 
were the general phenomenon. Also in India, financial crises had negative impact on FDI and growth. 
In concluding remarks we like to mention that a country which has a stable macroeconomic condition with 
high and sustained growth rates will receive higher FDI inflows than a more volatile economy. Therefore, it is 
expected that GDP growth rate, industrial production, and interest rates would influence FDI flows positively 
and the inflation rate would influence positively or negatively. Market size plays an important role in attracting 
foreign direct investment from abroad. Market size is measured by GDP. Market size tend to influence the 
inflows, as an increased customer base signifies more opportunities of being successful and also the fact that 
with the rampant development the purchasing power of the people has also been greatly influenced moving to 
many levels higher in comparison to what it was before the economic growth.  
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